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Abstract
Objective
The Affordable Care Act’s marketplaces present an important opportunity for expanding
coverage but consumers face enormous challenges in navigating through enrollment and
re-enrollment. We tested the effectiveness of a behaviorally informed policy tool—plan rec-
ommendations—in improving marketplace decisions.
Study Setting
Data were gathered from a community sample of 656 lower-income, minority, rural resi-
dents of Virginia.
Study Design
We conducted an incentive-compatible, computer-based experiment using a hypothetical
marketplace like the one consumers face in the federally-facilitated marketplaces, and
examined their decision quality. Participants were randomly assigned to a control condition
or three types of plan recommendations: social normative, physician, and government. For
participants randomized to a plan recommendation condition, the plan that maximized
expected earnings, and minimized total expected annual health care costs, was
recommended.
Data Collection
Primary data were gathered using an online choice experiment and questionnaire.
Principal Findings
Plan recommendations resulted in a 21 percentage point increase in the probability of
choosing the earnings maximizing plan, after controlling for participant characteristics. Two
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conditions, government or providers recommending the lowest cost plan, resulted in plan
choices that lowered annual costs compared to marketplaces where no recommendations
were made.
Conclusions
As millions of adults grapple with choosing plans in marketplaces and whether to switch
plans during open enrollment, it is time to consider marketplace redesigns and leverage
insights from the behavioral sciences to facilitate consumers’ decisions.
Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents the most sweeping and significant change to the
United States health care system since the establishment of Medicare in the 1960’s. The ACA
mandates health care coverage for millions of Americans, many purchasing private insurance
for the first time, and in the newly developed health insurance marketplaces. During the 2015
open enrollment period, 11.7 million Americans selected a marketplace plan or were automati-
cally re-enrolled, the vast majority of whom received federal premium subsidies.[1] While sub-
sidized insurance with coverage for essential health benefits presents an important
opportunity, consumers face enormous challenges in navigating the enrollment and re-enroll-
ment processes. The stakes for users of these marketplaces are high. As demonstrated during
the first open enrollment period, signing up for coverage can be daunting.[2] Evidence on how
well people are choosing health insurance in the new marketplaces environment is just
emerging.
Earlier research examined the quality of insurance choices of low-income, rural individuals
with those of an Internet-savvy sample, finding that both groups had difficulty choosing insur-
ance in a hypothetical marketplace that mimicked the federally-facilitated marketplaces, largely
because they oftentimes did not choose plans that aligned with their stated preferences (choice
consistency), incorrectly answered factual questions about health insurance choices (health
insurance comprehension), and could not calculate simple probabilities (numeracy).[3] If peo-
ple who lack insurance comprehension and numeracy make poorer choices, as we found, it
raises the question of whether plan recommendations might result in more effective decision-
making. If it does, our results can provide policymakers’ insights into what changes can be
made to the marketplace to improve consumers’ decisions. Here we focus on a sample of
lower-income, rural, largely low-income Virginians and test each of three types of plan recom-
mendations designed to improve decision-making.
Previous Research and Hypotheses
Previous experience and data fromMassachusetts suggest that 40% of insurance exchange
enrollees found health insurance information difficult to comprehend and nearly 20% would
like to reduce the number of plan choices.[4] In Medicare Part D, beneficiaries often spend
more money than they need to. It has been estimated that, on average, Part D enrollees spend
$350-$400 more annually than if they chose the cheapest plan available in their area.[5,6]
Earlier studies have also found numeracy and health insurance comprehension to be critical
skills in choosing a health insurance plan that offers consumers adequate risk protection given
their expected health care needs [3,7–9]. The relationship between these decision-making skills
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and the quality of coverage choices was consistent across a spectrum of uninsured individuals
differing in age, income, and education. Among individuals likely to enroll in a marketplace
plan, fewer than 40% are somewhat or very confident they understand basic insurance termi-
nology.[10] Research shows that even consumers who already possess health insurance often
lack basic understanding of and knowledge about their coverage.[11]
Moreover, re-enrollment provides a different set of challenges. During the second annual
enrollment period, about half of consumers who chose a plan in 2014 on healthcare.gov and
maintained marketplace coverage in 2015 actively renewed their coverage (53%, 2.21 million).
[12] The remaining 47% did not actively choose a plan and were automatically re-enrolled in
their current plan. In regard to plan switching, in California, about 10 percent of marketplace
enrollees switched plans between 2014 and 2015,[13] similar to research on the Medicare pre-
scription drug (Part D) market where 90 percent of beneficiaries stick to their current drug
plan during open enrollment.[14,15]. Individuals may stick to their current plan because,
among other things, they find it difficult to navigate multiple choices and the accompanying
information.[6]
Automatic re-enrollment, which facilitates keeping the status quo plan, is an important con-
venience to help ensure continuity of coverage. However, it also can result in much higher pre-
miums for marketplace consumers. This is true for two reasons. First, average premium
increases between 2014 and 2015 for a particular plan were substantial.[16] Second, federal
subsidies, which are used by over 80 percent of marketplace users, are tied to the “benchmark”
Silver plan. Premiums for these benchmark plans declined slightly, on average, in 2015, mean-
ing that subsidies declined as well.[17]
Changes in premiums for a given plan do not necessarily mean that people should switch
plans. Other considerations, such as the quality of the provider network and disruptions in the
continuity of care that could result from plan switching, also must be considered. Indeed, the
Obama administration has emphasized the need for all people who have coverage through the
marketplaces to visit the website and carefully consider whether the benefits and premiums of
their plan in the new year still best meet their needs.[18]
Taken together, these findings raise concerns about consumers’ ability to navigate through
the marketplaces, as well as to compare and choose health insurance plans. Providing informa-
tion that is necessary–but not so much information that it causes more confusion–is the major
challenge facing planners of these decision environments. While the designers of the market-
places have been cognizant of the need for simplicity, preliminary findings indicate that con-
sumers are facing challenges in making cost-effective decisions even in a very simplified
version of them.[19]
Emerging work in behavioral economics has attempted to tackle these difficult issues, sug-
gesting ways to redesign decision environments, called “choice architecture,” to aid consumers
in making decisions in general and about health insurance in particular.[20] Researchers have
proposed a range of options—using defaults, reducing the number of options, providing cost
calculators, and tailoring information—that could help consumers make better marketplace
decisions and that could influence policymakers.[21,22] Recent evidence from a hypothetical
experiment on the influence of choice architecture in the marketplaces suggests labeling plans
as Gold, Silver, or Bronze influenced consumers’ preferences for a Gold vs. a Bronze plan, even
when the plan attributes were reversed (i.e., a high premium, low deductible Bronze plan and
low premium, high deductible Gold plan).[23] Consumers with lower mathematical skills were
most susceptible to these labeling effects. Additionally, consumers chose higher premium,
lower deductible plans less often when premiums were presented in monthly vs. weekly incre-
ments.[23]
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Our research follows this promising line of investigation by testing the effectiveness of rec-
ommending plans based on lowest annual expected health care costs, a subtle type of change to
the marketplace choice architecture. This study examines marketplace plan recommendations
from three different norm groups: similar consumers, physicians, and the government. Such
changes to the choice architecture have been implemented in the UK to improve tax collection
by sending letters to individuals stating that 9 out of 10 people in their area had paid their
taxes.[24] Prior evidence fromMedicare Part D suggests physicians and friends are among the
chief sources consulted by beneficiaries when deciding which plan to choose.[25–29] In
another line of investigation, researchers have shown that the majority of Medicare beneficia-
ries would like to see an active governmental involvement in reducing the number of choices
available.[30] Indeed, active purchaser marketplaces limit plan offerings and, in states like Cali-
fornia, can tailor the order of plan offerings so that they are presented on the marketplace web-
site based on estimated total costs that includes enrollees’ self-reported expected health care
needs.[31]
In this study, a computer-based experiment is conducted using a hypothetical marketplace
that mirrors the one consumers face in the federally-facilitated marketplaces, and examines the
quality of the decisions they make in choosing health insurance. Of particular interest is
whether recommending plans that minimize total expected annual costs can improve consum-
ers’ choices. Decision quality was measured objectively by using an incentive-compatible
choice experiment where participant compensation is aligned with performance. Participants
were randomly assigned to a control condition, where no recommendation was made, and
three conditions where the earnings maximizing plan was recommended. It was hypothesized
that individuals assigned to one of the plan recommendation conditions will be more likely to
choose the earnings maximizing plan and will earn more than those in the control condition.
Additionally, we expect plan recommendations from providers will be more effective than
those from the government or based on social norms. Finally, we hypothesize that individuals
with lower numeracy or lower insurance comprehension will benefit more from plan recom-
mendations than those with higher numeracy or insurance comprehension.
Methods
Data Source
A community sample of individuals residing in the rural southern and southwestern counties
of Virginia was recruited using several media outlets including flyers posted in libraries and
clinics, advertisement in local newspapers, and through community recruiters. Adults who
self-identified as being 18–64 years old were enrolled and asked to complete an online survey
and several insurance decision tasks. In total, 690 participants were recruited during the sum-
mer of 2014 for a between subjects design where the four plan recommendation conditions
(i.e., no recommendation, social normative recommendation, physician recommendation, gov-
ernment recommendation) varied between. Of those, 656 had complete survey data and were
used as the analytic sample. Surveys and decision tasks were conducted on computers at local
public libraries and a community outreach and research center.
Insurance Choice Experiment
The insurance choice experiment was designed to span two hypothetical years (Year 1 and
Year 2) where participants read scenarios that informed them of the chance they would become
ill in the following year and, if ill, would require health care. The probability of illness and cost
of care conditional on illness were known. The probability of becoming ill in Year 2 increased
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if participants became ill in Year 1. If a participant was ill in Year 1, the cost of illness in Year 2
also increased (S1 Appendix).
In each of the two years, participants decided whether or not to buy an insurance plan
(Bronze, Silver, or Gold) for the premium amount listed or face a penalty. In total, participants
chose from a set of 7 options: 2 Bronze plans (Plans A and B), 2 Silver plans (Plans C and D), 2
Gold plans (Plans E and F), and no insurance. The plan attributes were taken from healthinsur-
ance.gov offerings for single coverage for a nonsmoker living in rural counties in Southern Vir-
ginia. These locations were selected due to their high rates of uninsurance as well as their
preponderance of low income and minority residents, all of which are of particular importance
to efforts to increase marketplace enrollment among vulnerable populations.[32–34]
Plan information given to participants included annual premiums (or the tax penalty for
the “no insurance” choice), annual deductible, annual out of pocket maximum, the cost of
health care if participants were healthy or sick excluding the premium or penalty, and the total
annual costs including premiums or penalties if the participant became ill or remained healthy
in the decision scenario. The prompts and decision tasks for the Year 1 and Year 2 scenarios
are included in S2 Appendix.
Quality of Insurance Decisions
The insurance choice experiment was incentivized so that the best coverage decisions were
those that earned participants the most money (i.e., choosing a plan that maximized total
expected earnings). For example, in Year 1, when the probability of becoming ill and needing
to see a doctor is 33% and the cost of illness is $2,000, Plan A is the earnings maximizing choice
(Table 1). In Year 2, when the probability of becoming ill and needing to go to the emergency
room and stay in the hospital is 80% and the cost of illness is $20,000, choosing Plan E earned
participants the most money.
At the beginning of the study, participants were given 10,000 Monopoly dollars and told
that each 100 Monopoly dollars is worth one real dollar. Participants were told their payment
Table 1. Expected health care costs in the insurance choice experiment.
Plan
A
Plan
B
Plan
C
Plan
D
Plan
E
Plan F No
Insurance
Deductible $5,500 $4,500 $2,250 $3,350 $2,000 $2,000 N/A
Out of pocket maximum $6,350 $6,350 $6,350 $5,500 $3,000 $3,000 N/A
Year 1
Total costs if healthy and do not need to see a doctor including annual
premiums or tax penalties
$108 $156 $400 $492 $1,148 $1,348 $695
Total costs if ill and need to see a doctor including annual premiums or tax
penalties
$2,108 $2,156 $2,400 $2,492 $3,148 $3,348 $2,695
Total expected health care costs $768 $816 $1,060 $1,152 $1,808 $2,008 $1,355
Year 2 (if ill in Year 1)*
Total costs if healthy and do not need to go to the ER or hospital including
annual premiums or tax penalties
$113 $164 $420 $517 $1,205 $1,415 $730
Total costs if ill after your ER visit and hospital stay including annual premiums
or tax penalties
$6,463 $6,514 $6,495 $6,017 $4,205 $4,415 $20,730
Total expected health care costs $5,193 $5,244 $5,280 $4,917 $3,605 $3,815 $16,730
Notes: Costs in bold represent the plan choice with the lowest expected total annual costs. The chance of getting ill and needing to see a doctor in Year 1
is 33% and the cost is $2,000 before insurance. If a person is ill in Year 1, the chance of getting ill and needing to go to the ER and stay in the hospital in
Year 2 is 80% and the cost is $20,000 before insurance.
*If a person is healthy in Year 1, they maintain a 33% chance of becoming ill and needing to see a doctor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151095.t001
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for the insurance decision task was the average earnings across the Year 1 and Year 2 choices.
After participants made their decision in Year 1, they were informed whether they were ran-
domly assigned as healthy or sick, and the costs of premiums (or penalties) and health care ser-
vices, if sick, are deducted from their 10,000 Monopoly dollars.
Participants were paid a $5 show-up fee, up to approximately $100 for the choice experi-
ment depending on their insurance decisions and chance, and $5 for completing a survey. The
average earnings across the Year 1 and Year 2 choices was 8,448 out of the possible 10,000
Monopoly dollars ($84.48 real dollars, SD $14.60, range $36.53-$98.90). Leveraging this incen-
tive-compatible experimental plan choice framework the quality of insurance decisions was
assessed using the following two outcomes: 1) an indicator of whether a participant chose the
earnings maximizing plan, and 2) the amount of Monopoly dollars earned.
Plan Recommendations
In Year 2, participants were given another 10,000 Monopoly dollars and were then randomly
assigned to a marketplace where either no plan was recommended, or their physician, other
enrollees with similar health care needs, or the government recommended a plan to choose.
Only the plan that maximized a participant’s expected earnings in the experiment was recom-
mended, although they were not told that explicitly. If participants were healthy in Year 1, a
low premium, high deductible plan was recommended in Year 2 (i.e., a Bronze plan). Con-
versely, if participants were ill in Year 1, a high premium, low deductible plan was recom-
mended in Year 2 (i.e., a Gold plan). Participants were given one of the following prompts: (i)
90% of people with their risk of illness choose the Bronze (Gold) plan; or (ii) their doctor rec-
ommends people with their risk of illness choose the Bronze (Gold) plan; or (iii) the govern-
ment recommends that people with their risk of illness choose the Bronze (Gold) plan.
Roughly one-quarter of the sample (24.0%) received no recommendation, while 23.7% received
the provider recommendation condition, 22.4% received the social normative condition, and
29.9% received the government recommendation condition. This unequal distribution across
conditions occurred because the randomization software in Qualtrics, the survey software, did
not evenly allocate individuals across the experimental conditions. The software tended to
assign participants to “government plan recommendation”more frequently than other condi-
tions. Nonetheless, the results are not sensitive to randomly dropping observations in the gov-
ernment recommendation condition to create equal groups across all experimental and control
conditions.
Covariates of Interest
Covariate information was collected in following six sections of the survey collected after the
choice experiment: 1) demographics, 2) health status,[35] 3) health services utilization,[36] 4)
numeracy,[37] 5) risk preferences in the health, gambling, and investment domains assessed
using the DOSPERT[38] and time preferences,[39] and 6) actual consumer experiences during
the 2013–2014 health insurance marketplace open enrollment period. The study was approved
by the Virginia Commonwealth University Institutional Review Board (HM#14789).
Statistical Analyses
Unadjusted associations between probability of choosing the earnings maximizing plan and
plan recommendation conditions were tested using Chi-Square tests, and bivariate associations
between participant earnings and the plan recommendation conditions were tested using Stu-
dent’s t-tests. Generalized estimating equations (GEE) with robust standard errors assuming a
binomial distribution of the error terms and a logit link were fit to estimate the adjusted
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association between the likelihood of choosing the earnings maximizing plan and covariates,
with adjusted associations reported as marginal effects. GEE models with robust standard
errors assuming normal distribution of the error terms were used to estimate adjusting associa-
tions between earnings and covariates. Wald tests were used to determine whether the coeffi-
cients of the individual plan recommendation conditions were different from each other. An
alpha level of 0.05 was used in all analyses.
Results
Sample Characteristics
Of the 656 participants with complete data, the average participant was 40.2 years old (SD
13.5) and most participants were female (67.7%; Table 2). The sample was predominantly Afri-
can American (78.0%) and the majority had completed at least some college (53.4%). Just
under half (49.1%) had never been married. Most participants were healthy with 77.9% indicat-
ing their self-rated health status was good, very good, or excellent, and fewer than half (41.9%)
reported having any chronic disease or more than one emergency department (ED) visit or any
inpatient stays in the past year (37.0%). On average, participants scored near the lower end of
the three-item numeracy scale (mean 0.54, SD 0.80) as well as in the gambling and health risk
domains, suggesting they tended to be risk averse. Regarding health insurance comprehension
and experiences, the average participant correctly answered two of the four health insurance
comprehension questions (mean 1.99, SD 1.10). About one-quarter (26.7%) of participants
were uninsured and 11.7% had individual private insurance. Finally, 26.5% of participants
reported shopping in the marketplace during the 2013–2014 open enrollment season.
Associations of Decision Quality in Year 1 and Participant
Characteristics
Less than half (41.6%) of participants chose the earnings maximizing plan in Year 1. Relative to
Whites, African American participants were 11 percentage points (95% Confidence Interval
(CI) 2, 19) more likely to choose a lower premium plan offering less coverage holding all other
covariates constant and at the sample average (i.e. the marginal effect), which in Year 1 was the
earnings maximizing plan under expectation (Table 3). Similarly, those with less than a high
school education were 13 percentage points (95% CI 1, 26) more likely compared to those with
a high school degree. Conversely, those with a bachelors or graduate degree were 10 percentage
points less likely to choose the earnings maximizing plan in Year 1 (95% CI -20, -1).
Associations of Decision Quality in Year 2 and Plan Recommendations
Unadjusted associations between plan choice, earnings, and plan recommendations. In
Year 2, before adjustment, 53% of participants chose the earnings maximizing plan when
experiencing any of the plan recommendation conditions compared to 32% in the control con-
dition (p<0.05). Specifically, 54% of participants assigned to the physician recommendation,
47% assigned to the social normative recommendation, and 57% assigned to the government
recommendation condition chose the earnings maximizing plan (p<0.05, Fig 1).
Participants earned 384 more Monopoly dollars (95% CI 109, 660) when assigned to a
choice environment where the plan that maximized expected earnings was recommended com-
pared to participants choosing health insurance without a recommendation, prior to adjust-
ment. Regarding the type of recommendation, participants assigned to the government
recommendation condition earned 475 more Monopoly dollars (95% CI 154, 797) than those
choosing without any recommendation. Similarly, the participants choosing in the physician
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Table 2. Summary statistics (N = 656 participants).
Variable Mean or Percent (Std. Dev.)
Insurance decision quality Probability chose Year 1 earnings maximizing plan 41.6%
Year 1 earnings (Monopoly dollars)* 8,852 (1,054)
Probability chose Year 2 earnings maximizing plan 48.6%
Year 2 earnings 7,818 (2,186)
Average earnings, Years 1 and 2 8,448 (1,460)
Experimental conditions No plan recommendation 24.0%
Earnings maximizing plan recommended 76.0%
Doctor recommendation 23.7%
Social normative 22.4%
Government recommendation 29.9%
Demographics Age 40.2 (13.5)
Female 67.7%
White 18.9%
African American 78.0%
Other race 3.0%
Less than high school 6.9%
High school or GED 39.8%
Some college 38.0%
Bachelors or higher 15.4%
Married 25.5%
Widowed or divorced 25.4%
Never married 49.1%
Monthly household income quartile
$720 or less 24.5%
$721-$1,200 26.7%
$1,201–2,499 22.2%
$2,500 or more 26.5%
Health status and health care Good, very good, excellent health 77.9%
utilization Any Chronic Disease 41.9%
Current Smoker 31.7%
More than 1 ED visits and/or any inpatient stay 37.0%
Numeracy, risk and time Numeracy (Range 0–3) 0.54 (0.80)
preferences Impatience (Time preference, Range 0–4) 2.06 (1.43)
Gambling risk (Range 0–5) 0.48 (1.00)
Investing risk (Range 0–5) 2.42 (1.56)
Health risk (Range 0–5) 1.21 (1.09)
Health insurance comprehension Health Plan Insurance Comprehension (Range 0–4) 1.99 (1.10)
and experiences No Insurance 26.7%
Family plan/employer 31.1%
Individual 11.7%
Medicare 9.7%
Medicaid 20.7%
Shopped in the marketplace 26.5%
Notes
*Participants earned Monopoly dollars but were paid in real dollars by averaging their Monopoly dollar earnings across both years and dividing by 100.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151095.t002
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Table 3. Adjusted Associations of Insurance Decision Quality in Experiment Year 1. (N = 656 participants).
Percentage Point Change in Probability Chose Year 1 Earnings
Maximizing Plan
Year 1 Earnings in Monopoly
Dollars
(95% CI) (95% CI)
Age 0 -5
(0, 0) (-11, 0)
Female 6 92
(-2, 13) (-54, 239)
African American 11* -113
(2, 19) (-280, 55)
Other race 18* -158
(-1, 38) (-537, 221)
Less than high school 13* 158
(1, 26) (-114, 431)
Some college 0 37
(-8, 8) (-110, 184)
Bachelor’s degree or higher -10* -91
(-20, 1) (-271, 89)
Married 1 61
(-8, 11) (-116, 238)
Widowed or divorced 8 -24
(-1, 17) (-202, 154)
Monthly household income quartile
$721-$1,200 -2 105
(-11, 7) (-70, 279)
$1,201–2,499 -5 -56
(-16, 5) (-252, 140)
$2,500 or more -10 -84
(-21, 0) (-289, 120)
Good, very good, excellent health 8 206*
(0, 16) (43, 369)
Any Chronic Disease -2 68
(-9, 5) (-75, 211)
Current Smoker -3 58
(-10, 4) (-81, 196)
More than 1 ED visits and/or any
inpatient stay
1 -43
(-6, 8) (-180, 93)
Numeracy 4 2
(-1, 8) (-77, 82)
Impatience (Time preference) 0 54*
(-3, 2) (12, 96)
Gambling risk 2* -30
(-2, 5) (-97, 37)
Investing risk -3* 23
(-5, -1) (-16, 63)
Health risk -2 24
(-6, 1) (-44, 92)
Health Plan Insurance Comprehension 0 -67*
(-3, 3) (-127, -7)
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Percentage Point Change in Probability Chose Year 1 Earnings
Maximizing Plan
Year 1 Earnings in Monopoly
Dollars
(95% CI) (95% CI)
No Insurance 2 -82
(-7, 12) (-272, 108)
Individual 4 45
(-7, 12) (-142, 233)
Medicare -3 -43
(-16, 11) (-285, 199)
Medicaid 3 -60
(-7, 13) (-267, 146)
Shopped in the marketplace 3 48
(-5, 10) (-92, 188)
Constant N/A 8,876*
(8,439, 9,314)
Notes
*p<0.05. Adjusted associations of experimental conditions, covariates and decision quality outcomes were estimated using generalized estimating
equations with robust standard errors. Marginal effects are reported for the probability of choosing the earnings maximizing plan holding covariates
constant and at the sample average.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151095.t003
Fig 1. Participants choosing the earningsmaximizing plan in Year 2, by experimental condition. Asterisks (*) indicate a statistically significant
unadjusted difference compared to the control condition at p<0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151095.g001
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recommendation condition earned an additional 378 Monopoly dollars (95% CI 26, 729).
There were no earnings differences between participants choosing in the social normative con-
dition and those choosing without any recommendation (256; 95% CI -120, 632). Earnings dif-
ferentials across plan recommendation conditions averaged across Years 1 and 2 showed a
similar pattern.
Adjusted associations between choosing the earnings maximizing plan and plan recom-
mendations. After adjustment for demographic characteristics, health status, recent health
care utilization history, numeracy, risk and time preference, and health insurance comprehen-
sion and experiences, participants assigned to any of the plan recommendation conditions
were 21 percentage points (95% CI 15, 28) more likely to chose the earnings maximizing plan
than those assigned to the control condition (Table 4). The hypothetical marketplace offering a
provider recommendation for a plan resulted in a 23 percentage point (95% CI 14, 31) increase
in the probability of choosing the earnings maximizing plan. Participants choosing in a mar-
ketplace where 90% of people with their risk of illness recommended a plan were 16 percentage
points (95% CI 8, 24) more likely and those randomized to a marketplace where the govern-
ment recommended a plan were 24 percentage points (95% CI 17, 32) more likely to choose
the earnings maximizing plan. In regard to control variables, African Americans were more
likely than Whites to choose the earnings maximizing plan (p<0.05) as were participants who
were previously married compared to those who were currently married (p<0.05).
Adjusted associations between earnings and plan recommendations. The unadjusted
associations between Year 2 earnings and plan recommendations were smaller in magnitude
but otherwise similar after adjustment (Table 5). Specifically, participants assigned to a market-
place where plans were recommended earned 311 (95% CI 39, 584) more Monopoly dollars in
Year 2 than participants who were assigned to the marketplace without a recommendation.
Participants choosing in a marketplace that offered a provider recommendation for a health
insurance plan that maximized expected earnings received an additional 360 Monopoly dollars
(95% CI 23, 698), on average, compared to those choosing without any recommendation. Simi-
larly, participants selecting a plan in a marketplace where the government recommended the
earnings-maximizing plan earned 391 (95% CI 77, 705) more Monopoly dollars than those
choosing without a recommendation. Earnings did not differ significantly after adjustment
between the marketplace and with social normative plan recommendations the marketplace
without any plan recommendations (160, 95% CI -185, 504). The adjusted effects of the plan
recommendation conditions on earnings averaged across Years 1 and 2 were similar.
With few exceptions, the control variables were not associated with Year 2 or average Years
1 and 2 earnings in the adjusted models. However, African Americans had lower earnings, on
average, compared to White participants, while participants in good, very good, or excellent
health earned more compared to those in poor or very poor health.
Subgroup analyses and sensitivity tests. To test the robustness of the main findings pre-
sented above, bivariate and multivariate subgroup analyses were conducted to test for differ-
ences in decision quality across those randomly assigned to “sick” and “well” health states after
Year 1, as well as test differences across participants who had and had not previously shopped
in the health insurance marketplace. In the first subgroup analyses, participants were stratified
by whether they were randomly assigned to a “sick” or “well” condition after Year 1. Results
from bivariate Chi-square tests provided insight into findings from the main adjusted models
presented above that African Americans were simultaneously more likely to choose the earn-
ings maximizing plan and earn less money. For participants assigned to the “well” condition
where the low coverage option with the lowest premium (Plan A) is the earnings maximizing
plan, Africans Americans were significantly more likely than Whites to select this plan
(p<0.05). However, for participants assigned to the “sick” condition, where the earnings
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Table 4. Adjusted Associations of Plan Recommendation Conditions and Choosing the Earnings
Maximizing Plan in Year 2 (N = 656 participants).
Percentage Point Change in
Probability Chose Year 2 Earnings
Maximizing Plan
(95% CI)
Any recommendation vs. none 21* - - -
(15, 28)
Doctor recommendation vs. none - - - 23*
(14, 31)
Social norm recommendation vs. none - - - 16*
(8, 24)
Government recommendation vs. none - - - 24*
(17, 32)
Age 0 -0.27
(0, 0) (-1, 0)
Female 6 7
(-1, 13) (0, 14)
African American 12* 12*
(4, 20) (4, 20)
Other race 17 17
(-3, 37) (-2, 37)
Less than high school 6 5
(-7, 19) (-7, 18)
Some college -1 -1
(-8, 7) (8, 6)
Bachelor’s degree or higher -7 -6
(-17, 3%) (-16, 4)
Married 5 6
(-3, 14) (-2, 15)
Widowed or divorced 9* 10*
(1, 18) (2, 19)
Monthly household income quartile
$721-$1,200 3 2
(-6, 11) (-7, 10)
$1,201–2,499 0 1
(-9, 10) (-9, 9)
$2,500 or more -7 -8
(-17, 3) (-17, 2)
Good, very good, excellent health -4 -4
(-12, 4) (-12, 4)
Any Chronic Disease -3 -3
(-9, 4) (-10, 4)
Current Smoker -1 -1
(-8, 7) (-8, 7)
More than 1 ED visits and/or any inpatient stay 6 6
(-1, 12) (0, 13)
Numeracy 2 1
(-2, 6) (-3, 5)
(Continued)
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maximizing plan is the high coverage option with the lowest premium (Plan E), African Amer-
icans and Whites choose Plan E with equal likelihood but African Americans are more likely to
choose Plan A (p<0.05), hence incur larger losses.
The main regression models above were also stratified by health condition assignment after
Year 1 and the results suggest that health insurance comprehension is a significant positive pre-
dictor of Year 2 decision quality among those assigned to the “sick” condition (p<0.05) but not
among those assigned to the “well” condition. Also, importantly, plan recommendations signif-
icantly improve the probability of choosing the earnings maximizing plan, regardless of health
condition assignment (p<0.05 in both stratified models). In regard to prior marketplace expe-
riences, assignment to any plan recommendation condition significantly increased the proba-
bility of choosing the earnings maximizing plan for participants with and without prior
marketplace experience (p<0.05 each). However, recommendations were not associated with
higher earnings among those who reported previously shopping in the marketplace.
The main findings were not sensitive to the distribution of the earnings outcome. Log-trans-
formed earnings models yielded equivalent results in terms of the sign and compactness of the
Table 4. (Continued)
Percentage Point Change in
Probability Chose Year 2 Earnings
Maximizing Plan
(95% CI)
Impatience (Time preference) -1 -1
(-3, 1) (-3, 1)
Gambling risk 0 0
(-3, 4) (-3, 4)
Investing risk -2 -2
(-4, 0) (-3, 0)
Health risk 2 2
(-2, 5) (-2, 5)
Health Plan Insurance Comprehension 2 1
(-1, 6) (-2, 4)
No Insurance 0 0
(-9, 9) (-9, 10)
Individual -4 -4
(-14, 7) (-14, 7)
Medicare -9 -9
(-20, 2) (-20, 2)
Medicaid 1 0
(-9, 10) (-10, 9)
Shopped in the marketplace 1 1
(-6, 8) (-6, 8)
Constant N/A N/A
Notes
*p<0.05. Adjusted associations of experimental conditions, covariates and decision quality outcomes were
estimated using generalized estimating equations with robust standard errors. Marginal effects are reported
for the probability of choosing the earnings maximizing plan holding covariates constant and at the sample
average.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151095.t004
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Table 5. Adjusted Associations of Plan Recommendation Conditions and Earnings (N = 656 participants).
Year 2
Earnings
Year 2
Earnings
Average Earnings Across Years
1 & 2
Average Earnings Across Years
1 & 2
(95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI)
Any recommendation vs. none 311* - - - 217* - - -
(39, 584) (28, 405)
Doctor recommendation vs. none - - - 360* - - - 252*
(23, 698) (18, 489)
Social norm recommendation vs. none - - - 160 - - - 139
(-185, 504) (-99, 378)
Government recommendation vs. none - - - 391* - - - 249*
(77, 705) (30, 468)
Age -8 -9 -7 -7
(-20, 3) (-20, 2) (-15, 1) (-15, 1)
Female 114 128 108 112
(-153, 380) (-142, 397) (-82, 298) (-79, 303)
African American -396* -403* -251* -253*
(-690, -101) (-698, -108) (-465, -38) (-467, -40)
Other race -341 -338 -233 -233
(-923, 242) (-925, 249) (-673, 207) (-677, 212)
Less than high school 58 51 108 106
(-451, 567) (-457, 558) (-255, 472) (-256, 467)
Some college -26 -37 1 -4
(-302, 249) (-314, 240) (-192, 195) (-198, 191)
Bachelor’s degree or higher -28 -25 -64 -63
(-393, 337) (-393, 342) (-312, 184) (-313, 186)
Married 264 269 156 162
(-60, 588) (-58, 596) (-72, 384) (-69, 392)
Widowed or divorced -43 -34 -38 -29
(-376, 291) (-367, 299) (-271, 195) (-262, 205)
Monthly household income quartile
$721-$1,200 53 48 74 74
(-273, 379) (-277, 374) (-153, 301) (-152, 301)
$1,201–2,499 -149 -147 -100 -101
(-511, 213) (-507, 213) (-354, 153) (-353, 153)
$2,500 or more -364 -358 -220 -219
(-752, 24) (-745, 29) (-491, 51) (-490, 52)
Good, very good, excellent health 443* 448* 321* 325*
(136, 750) (142, 754) (107, 535) (111, 538)
Any Chronic Disease 277* 284* 171 175
(8, 545) (15, 553) (-17, 360) (-14, 364)
Current Smoker -23 -31 17 11
(-284, 238) (-292, 230) (-168, 201) (-172, 196)
More than 1 ED visits and/or any
inpatient stay
92 81 23 15
(-163, 347) (-176, 337) (-158, 203) (-166, 196)
Numeracy -73 -78 -35 -37
(-224, 78) (-229, 73) (-141, 72) (-144, 69)
Impatience (Time preference) 21 23 38 38
(-59, 100) (-56, 102) (-17, 93) (-17, 93)
Gambling risk -95 -93 -62 -62
(Continued)
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estimates. Also, no significant interactions between the plan recommendation conditions and
education, race/ethnicity, self-reported health status, or insurance comprehension were found.
Importantly however, the association between plan recommendations and the probability of
choosing the earnings maximizing plan was significantly moderated by numeracy (p<0.05)
such that those with lower levels of numeracy benefitted more from plan recommendations
compared to those with higher levels of numeracy.
Discussion
The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services reported that roughly half of those enrolled
in 2014 actively renewed their plan during the open enrollment period, despite the fact that
switching plans has the potential to substantially reduce cost.[12] This study is the first incen-
tive-based experiment, to our knowledge, to investigate the use of plan recommendations, a
form of altering the choice architecture, to improve marketplace decisions. As advocated by
others,[20,21] the results support the first hypothesis that plan recommendations improve
decision-making in the hypothetical experiment. When choosing insurance without a plan rec-
ommendation, less than half chose the earnings maximizing plan in Year 1 (42%) or Year 2
(32%). Plan recommendations increased the probability of choosing the plan that minimized
total expected annual spending on health by 21 percentage points after adjustment illustrating
Table 5. (Continued)
Year 2
Earnings
Year 2
Earnings
Average Earnings Across Years
1 & 2
Average Earnings Across Years
1 & 2
(95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI)
(-220, 30) (-218, 32) (-150, 26) (-150, 26)
Investing risk 57 59 40 42
(-17, 131) (-14, 133) (-12, 92) (-10, 94)
Health risk 25 14 24 18
(-126, 176) (-137, 164) (-78, 126) (-83, 120)
Health Plan Insurance Comprehension -1 -8 -33 -37
(-115, 113) (-121, 104) (-114, 47) (-117, 43)
No Insurance -92 -78 -87 -81
(-470, 286) (-457, 301) (-353, 178) (-348, 185)
Individual 12 16 22 29
(-375, 399) (-370, 402) (-238, 282) (-231, 289)
Medicare -310 -278 -181 -166
(-756, 136) (-724, 167) (-490, 129) (-476, 144)
Medicaid -11 -3 -35 -31
(-390, 367) (-383, 377) (-304, 234) (-301, 238)
Shopped in the marketplace 50 40 41 38
(-239, 339) (-249, 329) (-157, 239) (-160, 236)
Constant 7,673* 7,703* 8,224* 8,243*
(6,827, 8,518) (6,865, 8,541) (7,630, 8,817) (7,653, 8,832)
Notes
*p<0.05. Adjusted associations of experimental conditions, covariates and earnings were estimated using generalized estimating equations with robust
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151095.t005
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the potential of introducing similar behaviorally informed policy tools into the Affordable Care
Act decision environment to benefit consumers’ choices.
Inspired by earlier evidence on Medicare and investigations conducted by the U.K. govern-
ment, the data indicate that two out of the three plan recommendation conditions—physician
recommendation and government recommendation—resulted in significantly better coverage
decisions. In contrast to the second hypothesis, provider and government recommendations
appeared to have equivalent effect sizes, although social normative recommendations did
appear to have smaller effects in some models. Earlier work on Medicare Part D suggests that
the majority of older adults would prefer the government to take a more active role designing
insurance markets to improve decision-making.[30] It is also aligned with reports indicating
that many older adults viewed their physicians as one of the main sources of information about
which Medicare part D plan to choose.[25–29] This evidence highlights the positive value
nonelderly consumers place on these sources of information about health care coverage.
Regarding the null finding for the association between social normative plan recommendations
and decision quality, it is possible that since many participants had difficulty understanding
and choosing a plan in the experiment they would be skeptical that “90% of people like them”
would have any more information about choosing a plan. There was limited support for the
third hypothesis that plan recommendations were more effective for consumers with lower lev-
els of numeracy or health insurance comprehension. Specifically, participants with lower levels
of numeracy were more likely to choose an earnings maximizing plan when choosing in one of
the plan recommendation conditions compared to those with higher levels of numeracy. How-
ever, we found no evidence of a similar moderating effect of health insurance comprehension.
Several important limitations should be considered when evaluating the implications of the
study. First, the experiment approach employed cannot capture the complexity of actual con-
sumer decision-making and the markets they choose in. For example, the role of networks and
preferences for providers is not addressed in the experimental design tested. Prior work sug-
gests concerns about coverage and access are very important in choosing a plan and that plan
choosers, correctly or not, place a high value on the ability to keep their current physician net-
work of other providers.[40] Moreover, the effectiveness of the plan recommendations tested
depend on full information on both the probability of becoming ill and needing care and the con-
ditional expected spending. The ability to provide such recommendations in actual insurance
choice environments based on this level of detail is limited. Nonetheless, plan choice architecture
can incorporate prior spending and health care utilization profiles and expected changes to these
historical profiles to predict future utilization and spending and recommend plans that minimize
expected total annual costs. Indeed the federally-facilitated marketplace in for the 2015–2016
open enrollment period includes estimated annual costs for consumers based on three broad cat-
egories of expected health care utilization (e.g. low, medium, high). Although the hypothetical
choice study does not fully reflect the dynamics of real-world choices, the incentive-compatible
design used to align payoffs with the quality of insurance decisions certainly mitigates some of
the concern about the external validity of the results presented.
Second, the data were gathered from a community sample of participants residing in several
rural counties in Southern Virginia and so the results may not generalize to those choosing in
marketplaces throughout the U.S. Also, the marketplaces in the experiment were modeled on
the federally-facilitated marketplaces and the findings may not extend to state-based market-
places where states have made more efforts to improve the comparability of plans when shop-
ping. Finally, plan recommendations are a subtle form of changing the choice architecture. The
psychological and behavioral economics literature offers a spectrum of different ways in which
the choice architecture of marketplaces could have other important influences on consumer
enrollment and re-enrollment choices.[21,41]
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Importantly, the results suggest that plan recommendations may be beneficial to a wide
array of consumers. The simplicity of plan recommendations, like those employed–either one
follows them or not—renders them attractive policy options for improving decision-making
broadly without limiting consumers’ autonomy of choice over the plans offered in the market.
Such evidence is again supported in the Medicare prescription drug market where beneficiaries
were more likely to switch plans when sent a letter about which plan offering lowered their
expected prescription drug coverage costs.[42] Given the preponderance of consumers who are
not actively shopping for marketplace plans, creating simpler and easier means to evaluate
plans could have substantial impact on consumers’ annual health care costs, the number of
individuals who switch plans, as well as the value of the federal subsidies provided. Addition-
ally, employing similar forms of choice architecture may benefit more advantaged and disad-
vantaged marketplace consumers. With the marketplaces having overcome troubled rollouts
and succeeded in robust re-enrollment periods in the second year, they have entered a third
phase, recently referred to as “Healthcare.gov 3.0.”[23] Looking ahead in this new phase, mil-
lions of adults will continue grappling with which insurance plan to choose and whether to
switch plans each year during open enrollment. Now is the time to consider marketplace rede-
signs that leverage insights from the behavioral sciences to facilitate and improve consumers’
decisions.
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